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Abstract 
The BRICS’ impact can be evaluated based on the degree of political coherence 
among them, as well as their capacity to influence the international system. This 
article will from the outset assume that the BRICS form a hetero-geneous coalition 
of often competing powers that share a common fundamental political objective: to 
erode Western hegemonic claims by protecting the principle which these claims are 
deemed to most threaten, namely the political sovereignty of states. The BRICS form 
a coalition of sovereign state defenders. While they do not seek to form an anti-
Western political coalition based on a counter-proposal or radically different vision 
of the world, they are concerned with maintaining their independence of judgment 
and national action in a world that is increasingly economically and socially 
interdependent. They consider that state sovereignty trumps all, including, of 
course, the political nature of its underpinning regimes. Thus, the BRICS – even the 
democratic ones – fundamentally diverge from the liberal vision of Western 
countries.
Introduction
Whether we like it or not, the BRICS are now part of the global geopolitical
landscape. It remains to be seen whether this evolving geopolitical acronym –
since, in 2011, South Africa was added to the initial group consisting of Brazil,
India, Russia and China – is able to structurally impact the global system
(Van der Merwe, 2011). Structural impact refers to the ability to shape one’s
identity or future configuration. Regarding identity this consists of proposing,
for example, a competing global narrative to that of the West (‘the world is
multipolar and state sovereignty is one of its essential features’). With regard
to balance of power, it involves changing the agenda, direction, standing
requirements and collective decision-making of the international community
in sensitive areas (multilateral trade negotiations, International Monetary
Fund reform, Security Council and United Nations reform, completion of
climate negotiations, implementation of the resolution on the responsibility to
protect). The BRICS’ impact can be evaluated based on the degree of political
coherence among them, as well as their capacity to influence the international
system. This article will from the outset assume that the BRICS form a
heterogeneous coalition of often competing powers that share a common
fundamental political objective: to erode Western hegemonic claims by
protecting the principle which these claims are deemed to most threaten,
namely the political sovereignty of states. The BRICS form a coalition of
sovereign state defenders. While they do not seek to form an anti-Western
political coalition based on a counter-proposal or radically different vision
of the world, they are concerned with maintaining their independence of
judgment and national action in a world that is increasingly economically and
socially interdependent.1 They consider that state sovereignty trumps all,
including, of course, the political nature of its underpinning regimes. Thus, the
BRICS – even the democratic ones – fundamentally diverge from the liberal
vision of Western countries.2
Yet this defensively strong coalition remains weak on the offensive
precisely because the sovereign states that form it pursue narrow national
objectives. Since they are very distrustful of one another for a number
of reasons, of which some are historical (Sino-Russian and Sino-Indian
rivalry) and others more recent (the Chinese rise), the BRICS have
trouble interpreting sovereignty as anything other than a zero-sum game,
including among themselves. This narrow attachment to sovereignty is
both their strength and their great weakness. As one Indian diplomat said:
‘The BRICS grouping has economic heft, but their political clout is
yet to be tested. They don’t see eye to eye on many international issues.
There is no common cementing principle among them. They have made all
the right noises at the summit, but each country will have to make its own
calculations as to how far they can defy the United States’ (Iiyashenko and
Sedov, 2012).
That is precisely what this article will try to show using two issues as
examples: the attitude of the BRICS when the selection began for a new head
of the IMF, as well as their attitudes during the Arab revolutions. These two
examples are complementary. They illustrate the BRICS’ attachment to the
issue of sovereignty and their difficulty in moving from negative solidarity to
positive solidarity; as a result the BRICS either adopt strictly national – and
therefore contradictory – positions, or develop purely defensive positions. The
commitment to narrow national interests limits the practice of active solidarity
among the BRICS.
The BRICS: A Product of Globalization and the Iraq War
The BRICS find themselves in two dynamics that are progressing in
confluence: one is economic, and the other is more strategic. The economic
dynamic is obviously the product of globalization. It is the one that led
investment bank Goldman Sachs to note for the first time in November 2001 –
two months after September 11 – the emergence of four countries (Brazil,
India, China and Russia) with economic growth rates that have now surpassed
those of the G7 countries (Goldman Sachs, 2001). The Goldman Sachs study
highlighted the gap between the official measure of wealth (nominal GNP) and
wealth relative to purchasing power (purchasing power parity). According to
the first measure, the BRICS only account for 8 per cent of global GNP. With
the second, they reach 23 per cent (Goldman Sachs, 2001). Ten years after
the first BRICS study, the figures largely confirm initial forecasts. Their
contribution to global growth is impressive: 36 per cent (Wilson et al, 2010).
The estimate for 2020 is 49 per cent, meaning they will collectively account for
a third of global GNP (Wilson et al, 2010). The BRICS are heirs to the
globalized economy and accordingly staunch supporters of an open economy
and determined adversaries of any economic protectionism, especially since
the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The fact that the concept of BRICS was
created by an investment bank, while that of the Third World was formed by a
demographer (Alfred Sauvy) reveals how much economic globalization has
come to shape geopolitical representations.
While the BRICS are the product of economic globalization, they are not
limited to it. At the same time– and this is what makes them original – they
are in a way the product of September 11 and the war in Iraq. The latter
highlighted the superpower of the United States along with the inability of the
rest of the world to oppose it (Pape, 2005). The first Gulf War in 1991 had
already made this imbalance evident, but the stakes were different at the time.
Whether the 1991 war was a pretext to reaffirm the US presence in the Middle
East does not change the fact that Iraq had indeed violated the sovereignty
of a state that was independent and recognized as such by the international
community. The context in 2003 was very different. In this case, the political
sovereignty of the Iraqi state was challenged on the basis of a redoubtable
principle: preemptive war (Jervis, 2003). The Bush Doctrine, which pro-
pounded preemption, was deeply traumatic for all the emerging countries.
They more or less explicitly reasoned that the United States would not hesitate
to use force against any country that might thwart its interests. The BRICS
themselves were obviously not directly exposed to this kind of threat. But as
powers emerging on the global scene and claiming influence on it, they had to
be wary of the Bush administration’s armed messianic thrust. These con-
cerns were somewhat dispelled with the advent of the Obama administration,
but the wariness remains. The Brazilians for instance had expressed concern
about the United States’ Plan Colombia in 2009,3 and once again raised the
issue of the purpose of US air bases in the Amazon during President Obama’s
visit to Brasilia in 2011.4 Brasilia wanted to ensure that these bases were not
logistical support for possible American military interventions outside of
Colombia.4 Moreover, Brazilian diplomats constantly refer back to the Iraqi
case, especially to justify their country’s refusal to pursue sanctions against
Iran. For Brazil, as for the other emerging countries, the application of
sanctions is but the prelude to war.5
The political crystallization that led to the emergence of the BRICS occurred
in 2003, even if it was chronologically preceded by the creation of IBSA (India,
Brazil, South Africa). In January 2003, at the inauguration of new Brazilian
President Lula, South African President Mbeki pitched to his counterpart the
idea of creating a group comprising Brazil, South Africa and India, to engage
in dialogue with the G8 countries ahead of the June Evian Summit, to which
these three countries had been invited by Jacques Chirac less than two months
after the invasion of Iraq (de Souza, 2009b). Two topics were on the agenda:
the Iraq war and WTO multilateral negotiations. This initiative was very favor-
ably received by both India and Brazil since, no sooner had the Evian Summit
ended than the three countries met again in Brasilia to sign the declaration to
create IBSA (IBSA, 2003). The three countries portrayed themselves as multi-
ethnic, multicultural and democratic emerging powers.6 The BRICS obviously
could not claim to share a common orientation with regard to the nature of the
Russian and Chinese regimes. They were not bound by democracy, but by the
desire to democratize the international system.7 The idea was that the regional
hegemons cooperate to pool their strength in the various multilateral
negotiating forums (Alden and Vieira, 2005; Beri, 2008).
This new alliance did not take long to politically manifest itself in a forceful
and spectacular way at the 2003 WTO summit in Cancun. No political player
explicitly referred to the BRICS at the time since Russia was not, and
still is not, a WTO member.8 Nevertheless, at the conference three BRICS
(India, China and Brazil), with the assistance of other emerging countries –
after care was taken to exclude Australia – joined forces to scuttle the Doha
round agreement that the Europeans and Americans had secretly prepared.
This blockade stemmed from these three countries’ refusal to ratify a reduction
in American and European agricultural subsidies that was considered patently
insufficient by emerging countries. But the opposition rapidly politicized.
At the purely trade-related level, India and China were reluctant to reach
an agreement simply because they did not want to liberalize their industrial
sectors any faster or further. They seized on the insufficient Euro-American
concessions on agricultural subsidies as a pretext to block an agreement.
Brazil’s position was different: it had a much greater interest than India or
China in reaching an agreement because the liberalization of the European
and American agricultural markets was a top political priority. In addition to
deeming Euro-American concessions insufficient, Brazil was not unhappy
to show Western countries that emerging countries were no longer willing to
accept WTO governance based on preliminary agreement between the United
States and the European Union.9 Thus, India, Brazil and China did not share
the same trade interests. At the political level, however, they benefited from
ending the Euro-American condominium over the WTO. Western countries
underestimated this aspect by writing off the alliance between Brazil, China
and India as only circumstantial, given their different interests within the
international trade system. This alliance did in fact prove to be substantively
circumstantial, but nonetheless had significant political consequences to the
extent that it helped to change WTO governance. It may be said that the WTO
has become much more democratic, and the Europeans and Americans are
evidently no longer the only key players. The failure of the 2008 negotiations,
which could have led to the completion of the Doha round, demonstrated
the ambivalence of these two results. On the one hand, it confirmed the new
position of emerging countries in the multilateral trade system, since India
(and the United States) was the source of opposition to finalizing the
agreement. On the other, India and China’s refusal to reach an agreement
thwarted the interests of Brazil, which remains committed to a successful
conclusion of negotiations.10
The Cancun experience had great political significance because it revealed
the emerging countries’ capacity to agree on a defensive political agenda in
relation to the West, despite their diverging long-term interests. Two different
dynamics thus gradually converged: at one end IBSA, the product of classical
coalition-building among certain emerging states to advance South-South
cooperation, and at the other BRICS, which began as a title invented by an
investment bank, but then gradually built itself into a political coalition. The
BRICS have acquired much greater political visibility than IBSA, but this is
certainly not due to greater institutionalization. It is quite the contrary. While
IBSA produced six regular ministerial meetings among its members beginning
in 2003, the first BRICS summit did not take place until Russia took the
initiative in 2009. The political recognition of BRICS is greater than that of
IBSA simply because the former group includes China and Russia. While IBSA
brings together mid-sized emerging powers, BRICS is a much more political
group that includes two permanent members of the Security Council, three
nuclear powers and two non-democratic powers. BRICS has been much more
difficult to institutionalize than IBSA precisely because the former’s ability to
develop a common agenda has been, and continues to be, more difficult.
In any event, the economic and financial crisis in 2008–2009 affirmed the
prominent role played by emerging countries in the international system more
than ever before. Without them, the recession would have been deeper. This
fact substantiated what Goldman Sachs forecasted a decade ago: the huge
growth potential of these countries. Accordingly, a whole series of demands
made by the BRICS, such as the democratization of the international system,
were echoed and materialized in the G20. The BRICS nonetheless view the
creation of this new club with ambiguity. While it offers the advantage of
opening the system by reorienting the global balance of power in a direction
more favorable to emerging countries, it also dissolves their specific identity.
That is the central issue: how can the BRICS justify their existence as such
when so many other emerging powers exist in the world, such as Mexico in
Latin America, Turkey in the Middle East and Indonesia in Asia11? Upon its
creation, IBSA had emphasized the multiethnic, multicultural and democratic
character of its members. This definition cannot be applied to the BRICS. One
might assume that the BRICS draw their legitimacy from the fact that they
bring together regional powers that have set their political ambitions on the
international scene. But in this case, why not include Turkey? In the end,
are the BRICS just creating a form of emerging aristocracy looking to be
coopted by developed countries to the detriment of rival countries? Is this but a
coalition of contenders for a permanent seat on the Security Council? In
attempting to answer these questions, it becomes apparent that the answers are
not so simple and that the BRICS must reckon with undeniable internal
contradictions.
Russia: An Atypical Actor in the Club
We will begin with Russia, the BRICS’ most atypical actor. It is not an
emerging power, strictly speaking, but rather a former superpower eager to
regain a part of the political status it lost in the aftermath of the Cold War. To
this end, Russia can draw on several assets. One is its legacy as a great world
power under the tsars and communists. This is a significant asset because
it makes it much easier for Russia than for the other global players to proj-
ect itself on the global stage, to hold a view on most key issues, to have a
substantial diplomatic corps and to uninhibitedly voice its views on the world
stage. These assets would of course lose their relevance in the absence of
material power, but there is always a time lag between the loss of power and of
its formal attributes. Compared with the other BRICS, Russia holds an
ambivalent or even ambiguous position. The BRICS form a coalition that
allows Russia to exist in a broader group when interacting with the West. It is
no coincidence that Moscow was most willing to politicize the BRICS at a time
when relations with Washington were deteriorating.12 Unlike the other BRICS,
Russia is a global power without being a genuine regional power, and it seeks
to mitigate its isolation by forming coalitions with other actors. Just like the
others, however, it sees this group as a means to multi-lateralize its power in all
the areas where its position is vulnerable. On the other hand, it is careful not to
play the joint card in areas where it has particular assets. For example,
Moscow is anxious to ensure the G8 continues to function independently of the
G20 even if that no longer makes much sense. Moscow seeks to protect its
status as privileged partner of the United States, be it to the detriment of other
BRICS. Russia therefore has no interest in increasing the number of permanent
members in the Security Council. It could calculate that the entry of Brazil or
India might help to counterbalance the West or even China, of which Moscow
remains deeply distrustful. This type of calculation is always risky though,
because it is difficult to anticipate the behavior of states. What is certain is that
Russia sees its status as permanent member of the Security Council as one of its
principal assets next to its nuclear power. Its economic and demographic
positions are much weaker. As a rentier state, its vision of the international
economic system is warped by the very nature of its economy, which is based
on the value of hydrocarbons. Therefore, Russia does not have like the other
BRICs a real strategy of growth and development. Therefore, Moscow only
joins the BRICS on sovereignty-related issues, and even then, only if the
BRICS agree on what they mean by sovereignty. Moscow received no sup-
port (or condemnation either) from the BRICS when it decided to invade
Abhkazia and Southern Ossetia in 2008, despite these two regions being
located within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. It notably did not
elicit a response from China, which is extremely stringent about respecting the
territorial integrity of internationally recognized states.
China: The BRICS as Fulcrum of a Global Strategy
The second actor among the BRICS with a particular status is China. It is
naturally an emerging power in the full meaning of the term. But it is also far
from being the most emergent of the emerging powers. It has the ambition of a
great power that purely and simply aims to become the principal challenger to
US power through pacific means. One of Beijing’s main objectives is to
accordingly form a privileged partnership with the United States. In this
perspective, China seeks to reduce the number of actors likely to thwart, limit
or relativize the centrality of its relationship with the United States. This
objective does not preclude the development of more or less structured
alliances with other actors. China’s strategy towards the BRICS stems from
this perspective: play the game of integrating into the capitalist system without
assuming the political consequences. The fact that China’s BRICS partners
have different political systems from its own – most prominently because they
are democratic – constitutes an additional asset for China, precisely because it
allows China to demonstrate to the West that stringent attachment to sovereignty
is in no way linked to the nature of political systems. In other words, if China
refuses the slightest interference in its internal affairs, especially for anything
related to human rights, it is not because it is not democratic, but rather because
it considers the protection of sovereignty to be crucial to a stable international
order. BRICS membership thus allows Beijing to share its sovereignist approach.
As is the case with Russia though, an alliance with other sovereignist states does
not imply a willingness to share its assets of power with them. This explains why
China is one of the states most hostile to what could be called a democratization
of the international system that might go beyond a greater recognition of its own
rights within this system.13 An example is its opposition to increasing the number
of permanent members of the Security Council. This is almost a strategic objec-
tive for China to the extent that the principal beneficiary of the democratization
of the UN’s system would be India, which also happens to be a BRICS member
that enjoys US support for its claim to a seat. As a result, the BRICS are a curious
coalition, wherein members seek to neutralize each other in the most strategic
areas of power. In a recent interview, the head of Brazilian diplomacy recognized
that China was most reticent to reforming the Security Council. He added, not
without humor: ‘China is not against reform per se, but it does not want to
increase the number of countries with veto rights’.14 In short, China does not have
anything against Brazil, but neither does it have any reason to give Brazil a gift.
As a strategic power that is intent on rivaling the United States, China is
naturally an economic power with a GNP that is projected to surpass that of
the United States at the nominal level in 2025. By dint of the simple fact that it
has become the second greatest economic power in the world, China has seen
its economic relations with the other BRICS significantly increase. China is the
primary trade partner of Brazil, India and South Africa. The interdependence
among BRICS is thereby considerably deepening.15 This development should
be interpreted with caution, however. The closer economic ties among the
BRICS have more to do with additional bilateral agreements than with any
integration among these countries. For all the BRICS, the region remains the
preferred level for economic integration processes. Moreover, China’s rising
economic power is a cause for concern among its partners, and especially for
Brazil. The latter is worried about Chinese inroads, which it seeks to counter by
strengthening economic integration within South America (Roussef, 2011).
Brazil: The BRICS as an Identity Support
This brings us to Brazil, which is unquestionably one of the central BRICS
actors. Under the leadership of Lula and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso
Amorim, Brazil played a significant role in the emergence of the BRICS. As
mentioned earlier, it was a driving force in forming the Cancun front. More
recently, with Turkey, it was central to a political maneuver to counter the
Americans with regard to Iran by attempting to negotiate a trilateral
agreement with Teheran on nuclear waste reprocessing. Brazil sees the BRICS
as an intermediary political circle in between the West – and particularly the
United States, with which it enjoys close relations – and Latin America, which
forms its natural economic and political sphere of influence. The complemen-
tarity of Brasilia’s objectives is expressed in the fact that Lula both centrally
integrated Brazil into the BRICS and crucially contributed to the creation
of UNASUR. However, this activism has reached its limits. In a recent
declaration on foreign affairs, the head of Brazilian diplomacy explicitly
referred to IBSA and did not mention the BRICS, even with reference to
Syria.16 In another statement, he emphasized that the nature of Brazilian
power was different from that of China and Russia.17 This omission is not
fortuitous. Brazil now understands that China is pursuing a big power strategy.
While it might share much common ground with Chinese objectives, it
certainly cannot build a strategic alliance given China’s economic expansion-
ism and its refusal to support Brazil’s accession to a permanent seat on the
Security Council. More generally, beyond China, it is apparent that Brazil’s
failure in the Iranian case has been instrumental in readjusting Brazilian
diplomacy since Dilma Roussef took office. Roussef would like to refocus on
Brazil’s internal problems and regional roots. Brasilia understands that it does
not have an immediate political interest in overexposing itself in areas where
Brazil’s main interests are not at stake, but where its activism is likely to get it
into trouble, especially in relation to the United States. In any case, in the
Iranian matter, Brazil was not able to count on either Russia or China when
the time came to vote on the third round of sanctions against Iran, as these two
countries had already reached an agreement with Washington beforehand.18
As a result, Brazil found itself isolated. It cannot be ruled out that the Russians
welcomed this failure with some relief. Indeed, if the Turks and Brazilians had
reached an agreement with Teheran, the Russians and Chinese would have
found themselves in the awkward situation of having to explain their alignment
with Western positions. Furthermore, the Russians do not want to see an
increase in the number of powers outside of the region intervening and thus
encroaching on their influence in the P5þ 1. It is also not impossible that the
Obama administration made Brasilia pay the price for its independence
by being tepid in its support for Brazil’s possible accession to permanent
membership in the Security Council. Meanwhile, the United States has
explicitly supported India’s candidacy. India is certainly not an easy partner for
the United States, which refers to India as a ‘sovereignty hawk’.19 However,
India offers resources that Brazil cannot when it comes to counterbalancing
China. Obama thus somewhat disappointed the Brazilians, who were probably
expecting too much from him anyway.20
The BRICS must be taken seriously because their centrality in the global
system is only going to continue to grow in the next years and decades. Yet
their existence has both great and contradictory implications. First, they
confirm that globalization, far from extinguishing national sovereignties, rein-
forces them as it transforms them. Second, they show that national sovereignty
in the narrow sense of the term cannot be the source of a collective political
project. The BRICS share a sovereignist approach to avoid sharing sover-
eignty. Their place in the international system should be interpreted in light of
this radical ambivalence.
India: China in Mind
Along with Brazil and China, India is one of the BRICS’ three heavyweights.
The country is propelled by demography, economic growth and ambition. As is
the case for the two other BRICS, a central priority is economic development,
which India considers a precondition for its strategic projection. India is also
heir to a long diplomatic tradition based on nonalignment. Of course, the
notion of nonalignment may appear incongruous today since it was formulated
at a time when India was seeking to maintain equidistance between the United
States and the Soviet Union. In fact though, nonalignment was a means for
India to assert its sovereignty in relation to the United States and China
through strategic cooperation with the USSR, especially after the 1962 Sino-
Indian War and the 1960 Sino-Soviet Split. China remains the greatest and
most concerning partner-rival that India needs to contain, no longer through
the strategic support of Russia, which is now too weak, but rather that of
the United States. A priori, the attempt to form privileged relations with
the United States to counter China may seem inconsistent with the BRICS’
goal of checking Western hegemony. However, an ambitious power’s strategic
reality rests on several complementary and contradictory dimensions (Khilnani
et al, 2012a). India needs the United States to enhance its economic develop-
ment and to counter China, but it has no intention of tying itself to the United
States to reach this objective.
The historical record of the United States bears out that powers that form
formal alliances with it have tended to see an erosion of their strategic
autonomy. Both India and the United States may be better served by being
friends rather than allies (Khilnani et al, 2012a).
This has not stopped India from increasingly deepening economic relations
with China or from worrying about the formation of a possible Sino-American
axis to its strategic detriment. Thus non-alignment actually expresses a desire
to maximize India’s options in its relations with the world. For the Indians,
nonaligned means: dependent on nobody. At the same time, the Indians clearly
see that their most important political relationships are those with Washington
and Beijing. The BRICS’ role is accordingly diminished.21 At best it is one of
several instruments for India to use in managing its relationship with China.
There is little doubt that if China was not a part of this group India would not
invest much in it.
India’s political involvement in the BRICS can be seen as the by-product of a
global strategy whose overriding concern is to contain China’s rise without
becoming part and parcel of the US strategy.21
The BRICS and the Bretton Woods Institutions
For over a decade now, the BRICS as well as other emerging countries have
demanded better representation in multilateral institutions, which are based on
an antiquated power structure that benefits Western countries. This pressure
increased significantly after the 2008–2009 crisis highlighted the central role
of emerging countries as both creditors and sources of global growth. The
demand first yielded the G20 and then resulted in the redefinition of quotas
and voting rights in the International Monetary Fund. On 15 December 2010,
the Board of Governors, the Fund’s highest decision-making body, approved
a package of far-reaching reforms of the Fund’s quotas and governance.
The reform package builds on the 2008 reforms, which became effective on
3 March 2011.22
This reform shifted more than 6 per cent of quota shares from over-
represented to under-represented member countries, significantly realigning
quota shares. China will become the third largest member country in the IMF,
and there will be four countries (Brazil, China, India and Russia) among the
10 largest shareholders in the Fund.
Besides their demand for better representation of emerging countries in the
IMF, they logically requested a change in the selection process for the heads of
these institutions in order to end the implicit agreement whereby the IMF is
placed under European control and the World Bank under US control. All of
the BRICS summits have emphasized this crucial point (BRICS Information
Center, 2012).
However, in the wake of the unexpected opening to succeed Dominique
Strauss-Kahn as head of the IMF, solidarity among the BRICS revealed its
weakness. At first, they all agreed to reject – and legitimately so – the European
monopoly over leading the IMF.23 However, some of them, and especially
China and Brazil, were led to pursue narrow national calculations that created
a real paradox, which was to withhold support for the only declared candidate
from an emerging country: the candidate from Mexico. For instance, the
Chinese knew that a Chinese candidacy was premature and unacceptable to
everyone. They therefore had the choice to either support another candidate
selected by emerging countries or secure the number two IMF position as well
as a rapid increase in China’s voting rights.24 They chose the second option,
which has partially materialized since Mrs Lagarde took office. Brazil faced the
same dilemma. It did not have a national candidate and could not have one at
a time when it was seeking to lead the FAO. Brazil logically should have settled
on the Mexican Carstens’ candidacy, which virtually all the Latin American
countries supported. However, one must account for the rivalry between Brazil
and Mexico, and the Mexican candidate’s identification with American neo-
liberal orthodoxy.25 It would therefore appear that China and Brazil approached
Mrs Lagarde’s candidacy with a national agenda that was partly at odds with the
search for a common candidate. The lack of time was officially cited to justify
the absence of a common candidacy. But that was not the whole picture.26 In
any case, the BRICS were not able to either put forward a common candidate or
support the Mexican candidate who was supported by all of Latin America, with
the exception of Brazil. This happened because, once again, these countries part
ways as soon as power games place them in competition with one another. They
have no problem collectively contesting Western dominance in world affairs.
By the same token, they have no difficulty individually getting along with this
same West to secure a particular national advantage, even at the cost of weak-
ening the collective position of emerging countries. In the end, ‘the differences
among the BRICS largely exceed their areas of convergence’.27
This difficulty in presenting a united front was once again demonstrated in
the spring of 2012 during the selection of Robert Zoellick’s successor as head of
the World Bank. The joint communique´ from the BRICS summit in Delhi in
March 2012 stated: ‘We welcome the candidatures from developing world for
the position of the President of the World Bank. We reiterate that the Heads of
IMF and World Bank be selected through an open and merit-based process.
Furthermore, the new World Bank leadership must commit to transform the
Bank into a multilateral institution that truly reflects the vision of all its
members, including the governance structure that reflects current economic
and political reality’ (BRICS Information Center, 2012).
Significantly though, it stopped short of broaching the idea of a joint
candidate, despite the fact that some, such as Brazil, aimed for this (BRICS
Information Center, 2012). The decision by the World Bank0s 25-member
board confirmed that the BRICS were not unanimous. Brazil and South Africa
backed Okonjo-Iweala, while China, India and Russia supported Kim (Table 1)
(Wroughton, 2012).
The reasons why Russia, China and India supported the US candidate
are not very clear, especially since these states did not officially state their
positions. However, it is reasonable to believe that India and China, as heavy
borrowers, pragmatically supported the candidate who was most likely to
prevail given that he was not only backed by the United States, but also by
Europe and Japan. They probably did not want to run the risk of supporting a
candidate who would have been defeated. By contrast, it is extremely clear that
despite the well-rehearsed discourse on better representation for emerging
countries and greater transparency in selection processes, on an individual
basis the BRICS acted opaquely. For example, they refrained from publicly
expressing their positions on the candidate of their choice, even though they
sent signals that left no doubt as to their vote. China officially deemed Mr
Kim’s candidacy ‘encouraging’ while regretting the continued US hold over the
World Bank. In the end, encouragement translated into support (AFP, 2012).
Thus, in selections that were less than a year apart, the BRICS were unable to
put forward joint candidates to head the World Bank and the IMF. Their goal
of creating their own development bank cannot mask this weakness.
The BRICS and the Arab Spring
This stringency towards sovereignty has increased in a striking way since the
beginning of the Arab Spring. At the United Nations, the BRICS formed a
united front against the Western countries to prevent a vote on resolutions
likely to breach the sovereignty of repressive states. Granted, they all voted for
Resolution 1970, which placed sanctions on Libya. Several weeks later,
however, they all abstained (with the exception of South Africa) during the
decisive vote on resolution 1973, which paved the way for NATO’s military
intervention. At first the BRICS abstentions were considered a form of prog-
ress towards relativizing state sovereignty on the basis of the responsibility to
Table 1: The BRICS’ support for candidates at the IMF and World Bank
IMF World Bank
Christine
Lagarde
Agustin
Carstens
Othersa
(Trevor Manuel)
Ngozi
Okonjo-Iweala
Jim Yong
Kim
Brazil D — — D —
Russia D — — — D
India — — D — D
China D — — — D
South Africa — — D D —
aInitially, India and South Africa were in favor of a single candidate for the BRICS, but they failed
to gain the collective BRICS’ support.
protect.18 The West’s political optimism proved to be quite premature though.
In one way or another, all of the BRICS expressed the view that NATO had
overstepped the rights created by resolution 1973 in Libya, and they feared a
repeat of this pattern in Syria. At the same time, they did not offer a single
alternative solution.29 They just decided to staunchly oppose a vote on any
resolution that might undermine Syrian sovereignty. To justify this attitude, on
15 June 2011, the head of Brazilian diplomacy explained to the Chamber
of Deputies that the big difference between Libya and Syria was that ‘Syria
had demonstrated its willingness to engage in dialogue and pursue electoral
reform’.30 Syria was deemed more reasonable than Libya even while the
Western approach to the latter was condemned. Yet when the West used the
Libyan precedent to argue that it was futile to believe in the Syrian regime’s
ability to reform, the same Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs retorted:
‘Libya is starting to become more amenable to a cease-fire, to the monitoring
of a cease-fire, and to responding to the demonstrators’ demands’.31 Here
again, this development – itself debatable – was not interpreted to the credit of
NATO, which forced the Libyan regime to make concessions through its
intervention. Even if the optimistic prognosis on the Damascus regime’s
willingness to reform has been completely contradicted by the facts, the BRICS
continue to oppose any resolution that might even remotely resemble resolu-
tion 1973, which is not even the West’s goal in this case. They are overplaying
their card, so to speak, by jettisoning the idea of sanctions. In other words, the
BRICS are refusing to vote for the equivalent of Libyan resolution 1970,
for which they had unanimously voted. Yet they have not put forward a
convincing explanation to justify this refusal, besides the fear of getting caught
up in a cycle a` la Libya that they seem to retrospectively regret not blocking.
They merely say no to Western states without being capable of proposing a
single alternative solution. This does not mean that their attitude is of no con-
sequence to the Security Council’s balance of power. The Security Council’s
presidential declaration of 3 August 2011 completely satisfied Brazil, which
had proposed such an approach since June.32 But, the worsening situation in
Syria and the intransigence of Damascus’ regime have led Brazil, India and
South Africa to shift - albeit reluctantly – their position. They tried to stay
midway between the West and the two implacable countries, which are Russia
and China.33 They abstained on the UNSC resolution 2012 which was vetoed
by Russia and China and voted for the UNGA assembly which was non–
binding (Table 2).
It is nonetheless interesting to note that when faced with a tense situation
such as Syria, some of the BRICS sought to take the lead. In November 2011,
several weeks after the Russo-Chinese veto on Syria, Brazil proposed to
supplement the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) with that of
Responsibility while Protecting (RWP) in order to prevent the use of R2P to
legitimate regime change, as was the case in Libya: ‘There is a growing
perception that the concept of the responsibility to protect might be misused
for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change. This
perception may make it even more difficult to attain the protection objectives
pursued by the international community’ (General Assembly Security Council,
2011). Hence the call to tighten the conditions for using force when imple-
menting R2P. These included a greater emphasis on prevention, the exhaustion
of peaceful means, the prior consent of the Security Council for the use of
force, and the judicious, proportionate and limited use of such force (General
Assembly Security Council, 2011). While it is clear that Brazil is seeking to
provide a better framework for the use of R2P, it is difficult to see how such
proposals might be operationalized because they have too much scope for
interpretation. For example, in the eyes of NATO the use of force in Libya in
Table 2: The BRICS and the Arab Spring
UNSC Resolution
1973a
17 March
2011
UNSC Draft
Resolution on
Syriab 4 October
2011
UNSC Draft
Resolution on
Syriac 4 February
2012
UN General Assembly
Resolution 253d
16 February
2012
Brazil Abstention Abstention —e Yes
Russia Abstention Veto Veto No
India Abstention Abstention Yes Yes
China Abstention Veto Veto No
South Africa Yes Abstention Yes Yes
The details of the resolutions listed and numbered in the table are:
aUNSC Res. 1973 ‘authorizes Member States (y) to take all necessary measures (y) to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’.
bThe UNSC draft resolution condemns ‘the continued grave and systematic human rights
violations and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities’ and calls on all states
‘to exercise vigilance and restraint’ in supplying weapons to Syria. Article 41 authorizes the council
to impose non-military measures such as economic and diplomatic sanctions on the Syrian regime.
cThe draft resolution ‘condemns the continued widespread and gross violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities, such as the use of force against civilians, arbitrary
executions, killing and persecution of protestors and members of the media, arbitrary detention,
enforced disappearances, interference with access to medical treatment, torture, sexual violence,
and ill-treatment, including against children’.
dThe draft resolution ‘strongly condemns the continued widespread and systematic violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities, such as the use of force against
civilians, arbitrary executions, the killing and persecution of protestors, human rights defenders
and journalists, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, interference with access to medical
treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, including against children’. To be noted that
General Assembly resolutions are non-binding.
eAs of 1 January 2012, Brazil was replaced by Guatemala in the UNSC.
no way overstepped resolution 1973 to the extent that the protection of the
civilian population was inseparable from the destruction of the military
potential of the Libyan regime, and ultimately its overthrow. Additional norms
will do little to help resolve eminently politically issues. The only question that
this Brazilian proposal really raises is whether the Security Council should
grant prior and explicit consent to the use of force, or whether invoking R2P
suffices to make the use of force possible. In the first case, the Brazilian
proposal would inevitably lead to more cumbersome UN procedures.
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Notes
1 This point is cogently noticed by John Ikenberry in the conclusion of his last book (Ikenberry,
2011).
2 They can nonetheless assert with some justification that the United States, for example, remains
fundamentally sovereignist despite its liberal orientation, as evidenced by its action in multi-
lateral institutions and negotiations. For example, the United States is largely responsible for
the current deadlock in WTO negotiations, or for the Security Council’s total lack of con-
demnation of Israel on the settlement issue.
3 For more details on this issue, see the revelations made by Wikileaks (2011).
4 Interview, Itamaraty May 2011. Brasilia.
5 Clinton and Amorim’s joint press conference in Brasilia (2010).
6 ‘All three of these countries, besides being developing, are plural, multicultural, multiethnic,
multilingual, multi-religious, and share elements of a common economic and political history’,
according to Indian ambassador Singh (Carpenter, 2009).
7 ‘Countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and a few others are the ‘new kids on the block’
among global players that shape international relations. They legitimately aspire to greater
participation in international institutions, which still suffer from a ‘democratic deficit.’ Global
decisions can no longer be made without listening to their voices’ (Amorim, 2010).
8 Celso Amorim underscores the role of the Cancun conference in the political process of building
the BRICS in (2010).
9 For more details on this case, see Laı¨di (2003).
10 ‘The United States’ main concessions in this round relate to agriculture. This is of interest
to Brazil. However, China and India will only consider it politically optimal to further cut
their tariffs if their exporters are offered tariffs conducive to their supporting an agreement’
Baldwin, (2011).
11 Jim O’Neill (2011), who coined the term BRIC, told the BBC it was a mystery as to why South
Africa had been invited to participate in their meeting: ‘South Africa is small compared to these
countries. South Africa is about half a percent of global GDP. And there are other economies
which have much more justification if they were to really look at similar potential to the Brics.
Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, Korea, even Saudi Arabia, Poland. I don’t really understand why
the Chinese and the others agreed to it’.
While this observation is economically pertinent, it is politically naı¨ve in the sense that the
thought process of the BRICS is fundamentally political. South Africa’s accession allows the
BRICS to include Africa and thus strengthen their international legitimacy.
12 ‘There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic
growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity’
Putin (2007).
13 Celso Amorim deliberately overlooks this point when he says: ‘The arrival of the BRICS is
revolutionizing the global balance of power by making it more multipolar and more democratic’
Amorim, (2011). Cf. my answer to him: Laı¨di (2011).
14 O Estado de Sao Paulo, 17 July 2011.
15 In 2001, Chinese exports to India, Russia and Brazil did not exceed 3 billion dollars each. In
2009, Chinese exports to these three countries respectively reached 30, 17 and 14 billion dollars.
In less than 10 years, Chinese exports to India have thus increased 10-fold. Source: World Bank.
16 Interview in l’Estado de Sao Paulo, 17 July 2011.
17 The New chief of Brazilian diplomacy, Antonio Patriota (2011), provides insights into the new
directions of Brazilian diplomacy under the new presidency, in a subtle speech.
18 With regard to the Teheran Agreement of 17 May 2010, the former chief of Brazilian diplomacy
writes that: ‘The insistence on sanctions against Iran – effectively ignoring the Declaration of
Tehran, and without even giving Iran time to respond to the comments of the “Vienna Group”
(the US, France and Russia) – confirmed the opinions of many analysts who claimed that the
traditional centers of power will not share gladly their privileged status’. This interpretation is
not false in itself. However, the chief of Brazilian diplomacy is careful not to explain why China
and Russia ended up voting for sanctions against Iran. See Amorim (2010).
19 Interview with Strobe Talbott (2011).
20 Interviews in Itamaraty, May 2011, Brasilia.
21 Quite significantly, the Non alignment 2.0 report makes little mention of the BRICS, and when it
does the BRICS are considered a strategic option among others: ‘India has also benefited from
its engagement with new institutions and groupings like IBSA, BRICS. These ought to be made
more robust, while simultaneously newer avenues of strategic engagement should be added:
such as the Indian Ocean region (going beyond the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium), Turkey,
Indonesia, Iran, GCC, “dialogue of civilisations”, among others. This is part of a strategy of
broadening our options and arenas in which we can exercise influence for different purposes’
(Khilnani et al, 2012b).
22 International Monetary Fund, Fact Sheet: IMF Quotas. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/
facts/pdf/quotas.pdf.
23 ‘This requires abandoning the obsolete unwritten convention that requires that the head of the
IMF be necessarily from Europe. We are concerned with public statements made recently by
high-level European officials to the effect that the position of Managing Director should con-
tinue to be occupied by a European’. In: Statement by the IMF Executive Directors Repre-
senting Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa on the Selection Process for Appointing
an IMF Managing Director (2011) Press Release No. 11/195, 24 May. http://www.imf.org/
external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11195.htmm.
24 For more on Beijing’s support for Lagarde’s candidacy (2011).
25 Brazilians are among the most hostile to the Fed’s monetary policy, which is conducive to
speculative capital flows to them. However, the situation was more complex with regard to the
DSK succession case. The Brazilian representative to the IMF and the Brazilian Central Bank
Governor seemed to favor Brazilian support for the Mexican candidacy. The Minister of
Finance apparently made the decision to support Mrs Lagarde, since the president did not get
involved in the matter at all. According to Valor Economico, 30 June 2011.
26 According to the Indian Minister of Finance: ‘We are working together with the BRICS
countries. It is difficult to say at right this moment because there is a divergence of views in
respect of different candidates’. Cited in Indian Ministry of Finance (2011) Also see: The
Economist (2011).
27 For a sober assessment of the performances of the BRICS made by these countries’
representatives, see BRICS.
28 The head of Brazilian diplomacy recently affirmed that his country’s abstention on resolution
1973 was akin to a ‘caution’ signal. The big question is what this signal meant: caution to the
Libyan regime, or caution to the West, which might be tempted to move too swiftly and too
strongly. He probably meant a combination of the two. See his interview in O Estado de Sao
Paulo, 17 July 2011.
29 ‘Brazil will not accept a document that is identical to the one that was passed against Libya and
that led to airstrikes’, Declaration from the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, cited in: Folha
de Sao Paulo, 10 June 2011.
30 Folha de Sao Paulo, 16 June 2011.
31 Cited in O Estado de Sao Paulo, 17 July 2010.
32 O Estado de Sao Paulo, 21 June 2011.
33 See the interview with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, O Globo, 7 August 2011.
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